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PRIVATE PLACEMENTS SHOULD BE
REGISTERED
ROSCOE

STEFFEN*

[In "Should Direct Placements Be Registered?", published
in the previous issue of the REVIEW,** Professor Cohan took issue
with Professor Steffen's viewst on the question and answered
negatively. Professor Steffen's affirmative reply follows. THE
EDITORS.]

There is much to agree with in Professor Cohan's study of the
private placement 1 problem. But, unfortunately, there are also
some things which cannot be accepted. Not least, of course, his
conclusion, which is diametrically opposed to what I conceive to be
in the public interest.
Perhaps a word should be said at the outset about viewpoints.
If I have read Professor Cohan rightly, he is of the school which
would go to some length to keep government out of business. Indeed, he accuses the SEC of "typical bureaucratic timidity" 2 for
not drawing up a list of persons-insurance companies, banks, pension funds, and plain people-who are "able to fend for themselves." 8
Although there is no statutory warrant for so doing, he says the
Commission should entirely excuse registration as to these persons;
in fact, he says registration should be excused as to just anyone
"who wished to be included" 4 on such a list. After all, he asks,
"who is the SEC to say him nay?"'
Of course, much water has gone over the dam since it was
of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
** 43 N.C.L. REv 298 (1965).
t See Steffen, The Private Placement Exemption: What To Do About A
FortuitousCombination in Restraint of Trade, 30 U. CHaI. L. Rnv. 211 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Steffen].
' The term "private placement" is used here in the same sense as "direct
placement." Both involve a direct sale. But the significant thing is whether
registration will be excused under section 4(1) of the Securities Act of
1933, 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958). Many direct sales are not
excused. The older term, "private placement," is used as best distinguishing
the transaction from a "public offering."
'Cohan, Should Direct Placements Be Registered?, 43 N.C.L. REV. 298,
313 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Cohan].
'1d. at 314.
'Ibid.
"Ibid,
* Professor
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the fashion to say: "That government governs best which governs
least." My suggestions, in any case, were made .to bring about
fuller and more consistent application of two basic national policies:
one, that of the Sherman Act,6 with its insistence on unfettered
access--even for securities-to a free competitive market; and the
other, that of the Securities Act of 1933,' with its emphasis upon
"full and fair disclosure." The exemption from registration provided by section 4(1),8 it seems to me, "has operated, more or less
fortuitously, in a way contrary to the spirit of those acts." 9
I.

BACKGROUND

On one point there can be no disagreement; the growth of private
placements, as Professor Cohan says, "has been one of the most
striking developments" in corporation finance "since the midthirties."' 0 Indeed, as his tables" show, the dollar value of industrial
issues placed privately and without registration has exceeded that
of the issues registered and sold publicly in every year since 1942.
And, for 1962, he reports some 3,678,000,000 dollars escaped
registration in this way, topping those issues registered and sold to
the public in a ratio of three to one.
The statistics for rail and utility issues present a different picture. But, only so because government intervened in 194112 and
194413 to require competitive bidding. I suspect Professor Cohan
regards this as unfortunate, for he points out that the "cost of flotation of utility and rail issues would surely have declined more
if competitive bidding had not been made compulsory."' 4 And, of
course, he is correct in a sense; the private placement does enjoy
a small apparent reduction in incidental costs. But the SEC and the
ICC had become convinced that if really significant sums were to be
saved, it could only be done by bringing about actual competition
for rail and utility issues. Hence for many years now, only the
626 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
748
Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958).
'48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1958).
' Steffen 215.
Cohan 300.

10

11Id. at 301-06.
12 SEC Holding

Company Act Release No. 2676 (April 8, 1941).

In the Matter of Competitive Bidding in the Sale of Securities Issued
under Section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act, 257 I.C.C. 129 (1944).
. ;
,Cohan 302-03 n.9.
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unusual issue has been permitted to go the noncompetitive, private
placement route.
Omitted from Professor Cohan's background material is any
reference to the legislative background for section 4(1). It seems
to be true, though, that no one who had anything to do either with
the drafting or the enactment of the Securities Act had any idea
that private placements would ever bulk so large. The pattern of the
act was to bring about "full and fair disclosure"' 0 for all securities, by means of registering successive issues as they came to market.
In this context, section 4(1) was of minor consequence; it was
thought to cover relatively few, strictly private transactions, where
both buyer and seller were fully informed. But, in light of the statistics, it may now also be said that "one of the most striking developments"'16 has been the extent to which congressional purpose
has been defeated.
II.

CONSEQUENCES

OF

GROWTH

Most of what Professor Cohan writes under this heading is irrelevant and somewhat misleading. Suppose it were true, as he says,
that private placements have "increased the degree of competition
in the market for long term corporate funds"' 7 and have contributed in some degree to the reduction of flotation costs." In both
cases, the lion's share of the credit must go to competitive bidding,
which not only has reduced bankers' spreads but has given issuers
an optimum price for their securities as well. It has been competitive bidding-strenuously opposed, and for obvious reasons, by
both bankers and institutional investors-which has set the competitive pace, not the private placement.
Actually the private placement operates in a sheltered area. In
the first place, since registration is not required, negotiations can
be had with no whisper of competing terms or prices. In the
second, only a small number of "sophisticated"' 1 investors (no
doubt with similar price views) may be approached, else the issuer
will run the risk of having made a public offering. And thirdly, since
underwriting costs are not involved, the investor has a nice leeway in
Steffen 221.
"8Compare text accompanying note 10 supra.
1' Cohan 301-02.
8Id. at 302.
19
Id. at 299.
15
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which to set his price. Perhaps this is "competition"-Professor
Cohan hails it as such-but it is surely a rarified sort. Plainly it

is not the bare knuckles kind afforded by competitive bidding, where
the issuer offers his securities in the light of day and has two or
more sharp-pencil prices from which to choose.
But, however this all may be, it is quite irrelevant to the present
discussion. The same, unfortunately, must be said for Professor
Cohan's further points: that the private placement has meant "the
development of quite new types of loans" ;"o and that many borrowers, unable to make a public offering, "have been able to obtain
long term debt financing at moderate cost."21 Surely it is clear the
question is not whether private placements should be abolished
nor even whether they have advantages over the public offering;
the question, simply, is whether the direct placement should be
registered. For all that Professor Cohan writes on the point,
registration might well enhance, rather than destroy, the usefulness
of the direct offering.
III. REGISTER ALL ISSUES
Under this topic Professor Cohan first essays to refute the two
propositions referred to above: the one, that Congress never intended section 4(1) of the Securities Act to be a loophole through
which securities aggregating 3 billion dollars a year might escape
registration; and the second, that the effect has been to give the
larger institutional investors a monopoly position which, if reached
by agreement, would violate the Sherman Act. Then, secondly, he
seeks to deny that any good consequences would follow, even if
private placements were to be registered. The result is confusing:
whether congressional policy applies is one thing; whether it is good
policy is another.
A
Actually, Professor Cohan does little to refute the point that
the scheme of the Securities Act-when viewed as a whole-is to
bring about "full and fair disclosure"2 2 for all securities. He presents nothing by way of legislative background to support his view.
He is therefore in the position of seeking to justify an exception,
20Id.
1

at 303.
Id. at 305.
Steffen 220-23.

2 Compare
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and so he denies-something not stated-that Congress intended
disclosure just "'for its own sake."2 Such a thing could not be
true, he says, for he "(and perhaps a few others) had always supposed" that disclosure was "to 'protect' the small, unsophisticated
individual investor who, in the nature of things, cannot tell the
difference between a balance sheet and a turnip tree."'2 4 This, of
course, is known as begging the question.
The point, though, is an important one. There is not a word
in the Securities Act to say that it is just "to 'protect' the small,
unsophisticated individual investor .

. .

."

But, to indulge Pro-

fessor Cohan, suppose it had so provided: was protection to
cease forthwith, once an investment had been made? Certainly
not. This legislation is full of provisions-limitations on insider trading, requirements for accurate reports, and so on-all
designed to protect the investor, small or large, after he has become
an investor. Not least of these, I suggest, is the requirement that
subsequent issues, too, are to be registered; this to acquaint investors
with the price and terms of the issue, matters of as much concern
to existing investors as to prospective ones.
Thus, if Professor Cohan is to carve out an exception to excuse
registration in favor of large insurance companies, he must defend an untenable proposition. That is, he must say that it is of
no concern to the "small, unsophisticated individualinvestor" whether
subsequent issues, often with terms and conditions vitally affecting
his interests, are brought out without registration, just so long as
the subsequent buyers are "able (perhaps only too able) to 'fend for
themselves.' "23 This, of course, he fails to do. But, perhaps sensing
the weakness of his case, he lamely suggests that I might "perhaps
be surprised"2 at how much information concerning private placements really does come out, sooner or later. The point, though, is
that investors need timely information.
B
The attack on the monopoly point comes off no better. When
Professor Cohan's objections to the supposed consequences of
21 Cohan Professor
308.
Cohan, also without foundation, purports to quote the
"Ibid.
writer as saying "everyone has a 'right' to know 'what goes on."' Id. at 309.
21

Steffen 221-22 n.66.

" Cohan 311.
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registration are put to one side, he says little to refute the point that
the large institutional investors now do enjoy a monopoly. He
merely says: "Monopoly is a nasty, emotional word, virtually devoid
of content and, therefore, it should not be used loosely."2 I would
suggest that the word monopoly is by no means "devoid of content," nor has the term been used "loosely." Since at least so long
ago as the famous "playing card" case 28 of 1602, when the Queen's
Bench struck down a monopoly granted by Queen Elizabeth, it
has been fairly clear that the power to exclude others from a given
29
commerce and to fix noncompetitive prices constitutes monopoly.
The large institutional investors have that power: they limit the
number of a buying group, to avoid having a public offering; they
are sheltered from competition when setting prices and terms, by
being excused from registration.
However, Professor Cohan continues: "The simple fact of the
matter is that the degree of competition in the market for longterm corporate funds has increased substantially since the mid30
This
thirties, thanks largely to the growth of direct placements."
statement confuses the growth or size of the private placement
market with competition. Let us apply Professor Cohan's favorite
illustration about butter and margarine. 1 When in the 1930's government required public issues to be registered, since that raised costs
-though only "by so much as a penny" 3 2-- it meant that some issuers would turn to the private market, as they did. But, even if this
shift could be described as an increase in "the degree of competition," 3 which I question, it still is no denial that monopoly now
exists. In antitrust law proof of some competition is not a defense;
nothing short of "free and unfettered '34 competition will do.
In any case, Professor Cohan virtually concedes the point in his
conclusion. He differs only on the method by which full competition
can best be brought about. His solution, as noted above, is to open
the doors wide and excuse registration entirely as to anyone-bank,
27
Id. at 312.
'" Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke 84, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (Q.B. 1602).
"' See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Cohan 312.
See Id. at 311 & n.22, 312, 313.
32 Id. at 311.
RId. at 312.
"Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (Black, J.).
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insurance company, or individual-who signifies that he would
like to trade in the private placement area. In other words, Professor Cohan would in truth make a full retreat "in the direction of
the status quo circa 1935.2"'
But, he says, we would then have "a
vigorously competitive market indeed."130 In fact, he asserts that
such a market "might well prove to be the single most competitive
"
market in the country. 1sr
One does not have to go so far to restore competition. The
truth is, a fully registered direct placement market would be equally,
in fact more, competitive. In the first place, the public market would
no longer be under its present handicap; each market would have
similar registration costs. Professor Cohan recognizes the point,
for he says registration "would make it more difficult for the
financial institutions to compete with the public market . . .. as
That is not an argument against registration; nor does it deny that
the large institutional investors presently do have an artificial
competitive advantage. It is simply a bare assertion that Professor
Cohan thinks, for reasons not stated, that the big investors should
be allowed to keep their advantage indefinitely, even though it means
less real competition.
Nor is there any reason to suppose that competition within the
private placement sector would be greater under a plan of nonregistration than if there were general registration. For one thing,
the private placement, as noted above, is done quietly, without notice
to anyone. Thus, there is usually no opportunity for competitors
with a better price, or, more important, with different terms or conditions, 9 to present their case. The private placee does not even
have to meet the latent sort of competition which comes from knowing that the details of a transaction are to be spread on the public
record, before the deal is closed. Of course, the issuer would gain
the opportunity to approach others, if he thought best. But his opCohan 312.
Id. at 314.
7Ibid.
SId. at 312.

T

' Price competition is one thing, competition as to terms is another. As
things now stand, the large institutional investors are in position to tie up
an issuer by many restrictive clauses--concerning dividends, business expansion, and so on-with none of the restraint that comes from publicity, to
say nothing of the effect competition might have. These are important considerations. See Steffen 231.
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portunity to do this would surely be no less, if the issue had been
registered.
Only a word is necessary to dispose of Professor Cohan's last
and most hopeful point, that, since issuers do not presently register
their private issues, it must be they "do not believe that registra"...
40 Of course, the question is not
tion would be worthwhile .
whether issuers regard registration as worthwhile, as well they may;
it is whether registration affords a useful protection, especially
to "the small, unsophisticated individual investor." That aside, the
argument is not very realistic. When the borrower goes to Wall
Street with cap in hand, why should he affront the lender by saying,
"of course, I am going to the trouble of having the issue registered
to make sure I get a fair, competitive deal"? No, the conclusion to
be drawn from non-registration today is simply that a voluntary
system will not work41 anymore here than in the public sector.
And, although registration there is required, no one-issuer,
broker, or investor-has in recent years seriously advocated a return to pre-SEC days.
IV. CONCiUsioNs

Perhaps because of Professor Cohan's zeal to excuse registration for those lenders "able to fend for themselves," he did not
discuss the after market. The present situation is that billions
of dollars of securities have piled up in the hands of large investors, without registration, and yet the conditions under which
all or part of these may be resold in case of need are by no means
clear. There would seem to be two imperatives: one, that resale of
such securities should be permitted in future to anyone, without
new registration; and, two, since all buyers on resale may not be
assumed to be "sophisticated," there should be initial registration,
as discussed above.
Finally, it should be stated again that there has been no purpose
"to favor one or another of the actors in this drama."4 The object,
on the contrary, has been "to broaden the private placement market-to let in enough competition to square with antitrust policyCohan 313.
Aside from the small additional expense entailed, there are other reasons. For example, the issuer would subject himself to the civil liabilities
stated in section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 82, 15 U.S.C. §
77k (1958), if the issue were registered.
" Steffen 215.
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and also to provide
the purposes of the
enterprise," let the
hindmost."" That
strong.

"Id. at 238.
"Id. at 215.
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for full and fair disclosure-to conform with
Securities Act."' 43 Then, "in the spirit of free
actors "fight it out, and the devil take the
way our economy has prospered and grown

